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FEDERALISM'S FALSE HOPE: HOW STATE
CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS ARE SYSTEMATICALLY

UNDER-ENFORCED IN FEDERAL FORUMS
(AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT)
Steven Andrew Smith* & Adam Hansen**
If state and federal civil rights laws had a narrative, it might go
something like this: in the beginning, state governments were the
obstacles to liberty and equality. Since the end of the Civil War,
states-southern states especially-were haunted by the legacy of Jim
Crow-passive enablers of private discrimination at best, active
participants at worst. Although interested in providing relief,1 the
federal government was largely powerless to act.2
About mid-way through the twentieth century, three key trends
converged to change this status quo, placing vast supervisory authority
in the civil rights arena in the hands of the federal government, and the
federal courts in particular. First, the civil rights movement-led by the
Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. and others, and projected into the
American living room by Walter Cronkite 3-- entered the mainstream
American consciousness, cementing itself as a national problem worthy
of a national response.4 Second, the legacy of the New Deal left the
federal government with greatly expanded powers to deal with civil
rights violations. As an example, while the Supreme Court in 1883
struck down portions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 barring

Steven Andrew Smith, J.D. William Mitchell College of Law 1995 (cum laude), is a partner at
Nichols Kaster, PLLP in Minneapolis where he represents employees exclusively in individual,
class, and collective action cases.
Adam Hansen, J.D. University of Minnesota, 2008.
1. See, e.g., Federal Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, § 4, 18 Stat. 335, 336 (current version
at 18 U.S.C. § 243 (2000)) (stating that a fine will be imposed on anyone who disqualifies a juror on
the basis of their race).
2. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 4, 25 (1883) (striking down the Civil Rights
Act of 1875 as beyond the constitutional authority of Congress to enact).
3. See WALTER CRONKITE, A REPORTER'S LIFE 289-90, 292-94 (1996).
4. See id. at 294-95.
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discrimination in public accommodations, 5 the Court-61 years laterupheld similar provisions in the newly-enacted Civil Rights Act of
1964.6 In the intervening period, the Supreme Court had dramatically
changed its understanding of the breadth of Congress's power to
"regulate Commerce .

among the several States" 7 adopting an
expansive view of congressional power during the New Deal-a view
that persisted through the Civil Rights era. 8 This expanded power, in
.

.

turn, gave Congress near carte blanche power to legislate in the name of
preventing civil rights abuses. 9 Third, a strong political will to pursue

federal civil rights violations through both public
enforcement mechanisms in the

°

and private"

1960s and 1970s led to zealous

enforcement of federal civil rights statutes--effectively narrowing the
gap between abstract legal protections and enforceable legal rights. 2 In
this new universe of federal civil rights enforcement, the federal
judiciary played an active role. Initially, under the guidance of the
Warren Court, the federal courts interpreted federal civil rights laws
generously,1 3 often looking to the broad remedial purpose of such laws
in making victims of discrimination whole. 14 To this day, discrimination
5. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 9-10, 25.
6. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 249, 261 (1964) (upholding Title II
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as validly applied to the Heart of Atlanta Motel, which wished to
continue its policy of refusing to rent rooms to African Americans); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294, 297, 298, 304 (1964) (upholding Title 11of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as validly applied
to the Ollie's Barbeque, a restaurant which wished to continue its policy of refusing to seat African
Americans).
7. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl.
3.
8. See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV.
1189, 1260 (1986) (describing the Supreme Court's use of the Commerce Clause in establishing
broad federal regulatory power); see also Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 261; Katzenbach, 379
U.S. at 304, 305.
9. E.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a-2000h-6 (1964);
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2000).
10. See generally Michael Waterstone, A New Vision of Public Enforcement, 92 MINN. L.
REV. 434, 449-55 (2007) (describing the effect of public enforcement); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT 10 (1971) (recounting how immediately
the Department of Justice reacted after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); RICHARD C.
CORTNER, CIVIL RIGHTS AND PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS: THE HEART OF ATLANTA MOTEL AND

MCCLUNG CASES 26-27 (2001) (detailing the composition of the Civil Rights Division of the
Department of Justice upon the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
11. Waterstone, supra note 10, at 442-43 (describing how even private enforcement of federal
civil rights laws was initially driven largely by public interest groups and federal funding).
12. See Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, After Public Interest Law, 100 Nw. U. L. REV.
1251, 1252-54 (2006) (describing the impact of lawyers on the development of public interest law).
13. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954) (holding separate but equal
had no place in public education).
14. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30, 436 (1971) (adopting an
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victims look primarily to federal civil rights laws and the federal courts
for relief.
Of course, this narrative is correct so far as it goes. But still the full
story remains largely-and surprisingly-untold. At the state level over
the past quarter century, the civil rights landscape has undergone a quiet
revolution.

While the federal civil rights regime has weakened,

numerous states, as a substantive matter, have passed civil rights statutes
exceeding federal law in their scope and breadth of protection. 15 In
Minnesota, for example, state law affords victims of discrimination
16
greater protection than they would otherwise receive under federal law.

Persons suffering from sexual harassment, disability discrimination, or
sexual orientation discrimination, for example, all receive greater
17
protection under Minnesota law than they receive under federal law.
As has been thoroughly documented by other commentators,
federal civil right protections have progressively weakened in recent

years.' 8 As one factor in this federal decline, the federal judiciary has
become increasingly hostile towards discrimination victims and their
lawsuits filed in federal court. The cases of Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., Inc.' 9 and Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West
Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources20 are two recent
examples illustrating this point. Ledbetter all but closed the door on
victims of wage discrimination, holding that issuing a paycheck does not

count as a new act of discrimination, even if the employer decided at an
earlier time to pay certain employees less money because of their race,

expansive interpretation of Title VII; citing the "objective of Congress ... to achieve equality of
employment opportunities" as a reason for recognizing certain acts of non-intentional discrimination
as a violation of federal civil rights law).
15. See, e.g., Sande L. Buhai, In the Meantime: Sate Protection of Disablity Civil Rights, 37
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1065, 1089-96 (2004) (summarizing examples of where state disability laws are
more protective than parallel federal measures).
16. Compare Minnesota Human Rights Act, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.02 (West 2000)
(protecting a wide variety of classifications from a broad range of discriminatory practices), with
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)-(e) (2000) (prohibiting discrimination
based on race, color, national origin, sex and religion in various employment contexts), and Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a)-(e) (2000) (prohibiting discrimination
based on age in various employment contexts), and Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12111-12 (2000) (prohibiting discrimination based on disability in various employment
contexts).
17. See infra Part I (discussing three of the various areas where greater protection is provided
under Minnesota law than under federal law).
18. See generally Waterstone, supra note 10, at 438 & n.14 (citing various commentators to
this effect).
19. 127 S.Ct. 2162 (2007).
20. 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
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sex, or religion. 21 Buckhannon limited the ability of plaintiffs' lawyers

to recover attorney's fees, 22 making it increasingly difficult for some
plaintiffs to find counsel willing to litigate their discrimination claims,

especially in cases seeking only injunctive relief. 23 Further examples of
this phenomenon-the narrow reading of federal civil rights statutes by
the federal courts-are discussed in Part I of this Article.
In addition to changes in judicial interpretation of federal civil
rights laws, public enforcement of these laws has waned.
The

Department of Justice's strong public enforcement campaign from the
1960s and 1970s has largely dried up. 24 The same is true for
enforcement measures brought by public interest organizations, many of
which received public money largely from the Legal Services
Corporation.2 5 Funding for the Legal Services Corporation has been cut
over the last two decades.2 6

Finally, the Supreme Court during the Rehnquist era began to rein
in the constitutional authority of Congress to pass civil rights legislation.
For example, the Court in United States v. Morrison,27 ruled that

Congress lacked the authority to pass the Violence Against Women Act
of 1994.28 In reaching this holding, the Court articulated new limits on

Congress's ability to regulate interstate commerce and enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment.29
As another example, the Court has

21. Ledbetter, 127 S.Ct. at 2174 (citing Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc.,
490 U.S. 900, 911
(1989)). The Ledbetter case dealt with unequal pay on the basis of the recipient's sex, but the
holding of the case naturally extends to unequal pay on the basis of any impermissible
classification. Ledbetter, 127 S.Ct. at 2165, 2168 (citing Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S.
250, 253-54, 257-58 (1980)) (identifying a case based on racial discrimination as relevant to the
determination of the sex discrimination claims made by Ledbetter). Congress has since enacted
legislation reversing Ledbetter. See Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123
Stat. 5 (Jan. 29, 2009) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5).
22. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605 (citations omitted).
23. See Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The ProceduralAttack on Civil Rights:
The EmpiricalReality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1087,
1090-92 (2007) (discussing the negative effects of Buckhannon on private organizations that bring
civil rights cases, specifically, the difficulty in bringing private suits for injunctive relief).
24. See Waterstone, supra note 10, at 457-60.
25. See id. at 442-45; see also Louise G. Trubek, Crossing Boundaries: Legal Education and
the Challenge of the "New Public Interest Law, " 2005 WIs. L. REV. 455, 456-60 (characterizing
the 1960s and 1970s as "classic" era of public interest law).
26. See ABA, Capitol Building American Bar Association 2002 Legislative and
Governmental
Priorities
Legal
Services
Corporation,
Jan.
2,
2003,
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/priorities/lsc.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2008).
27. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
28. Id. at 605, 627.
29. Id. at 617-19 (citations omitted). In many ways, Morrison and its progeny marked a
return to a much older understanding of congressional power. For example, Morrison reaffirmed
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resurrected its Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, narrowing the
circumstances under which private individuals can enforce their civil
rights against state violators in federal court.3 °
Giving these two divergent trends-the expanding body of state
civil rights law in many states, and the shrinking scope of federal civil
rights law-it seems logical to take a hard look at state civil rights law
and ask whether this body of law can do the heavy lifting once
accomplished by federal law. Unfortunately, a third trend in civil rights
law (and the focus of this Article) has developed: the under-enforcement
of state civil rights laws in federal courts. A flip through the pages of
the Federal Reporter reveals a disturbing trend: again and again, when
victims of discrimination press their claims in federal court, federal
judges refuse to treat state civil rights laws seriously, as an independent
body of legal rules. 31 Instead, these judges prefer to treat state civil
rights law as coextensive with federal law (often incorrectly so, and
usually without any analysis or justification for the practice).3 2
Oftentimes, federal courts seem to ignore state law altogether.3 3
This Article systematically examines this practice and offers a
battery of remedies. We proceed as follows: Parts I and II seek to
demonstrate the existence of a problem: the under-enforcement of state
civil rights laws in federal court. Focusing on Minnesota's civil rights
laws, 34 Part I of this Article examines two discrete areas of civil rights
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), with its strict dichotomy of private discrimination (which
Congress cannot remedy under the Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power) and public
discrimination (which Congress may address). Morrison, 529 U.S. at 620-21.
In spite of this strict dichotomy, federal civil rights laws have expanded legislatively over the past
twenty-five years to a certain extent. Most notably, the 1990s and the present decade have seen the
passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and the
Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000); 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (2000); 38 U.S.C. § 4301 (2000). However, it appears that even this relatively
newer legislation has not been immune from the three federal trends identified above: waning
enforcement, narrow judicial construction, and limited constitutional authority to apply the law in
all circumstances.
30. See, e.g., Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360, 363-64,
374 (2001) (holding that private litigant could not bring a damages claim under Title I of the ADA
against Alabama).
31. See discussion infra Part lI.B.
32. See discussion infra Part II.C.
33. See discussion infra Part II.C.
34. We chose to narrow our focus to Minnesota civil rights laws for three reasons. First,
Minnesota seemed a particularly well-suited forum for testing our hypothesis that state civil rights
laws are under-enforced in federal courts. Minnesota, as a state, has a long tradition of progressive
state laws and robust civil rights protections. But Minnesota, as a district in the federal court
system, sits in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, one of the more conservative federal courts in
the country. See Yvette K. Shultz, Runaway Train - The Retaliation Scene After Burlington
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law: sexual harassment and disability discrimination. Contrasting the
text, legislative history, and doctrinal development of state and federal
law, this Part shows how Minnesota's civil rights laws offer greater
substantive protection (in the abstract) when compared to federal civil
rights laws. Part II then turns to the enforcement of civil rights laws in
federal court. Using an analysis of cases decided during the past
seventeen years by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, this Part shows that Minnesota's civil rights laws are chronically
and systematically under-enforced in federal court. Part III offers a
series of measures aimed at restoring state civil rights law as an
independent and vibrant source of protection for victims of
discrimination in federal court. Specifically, this Article makes four
basic recommendations, each one focusing on a different institutional
actor. First, attorneys on the civil rights bar must place a renewed
emphasis on the primacy of state civil rights law in both state and federal
courts. Second, federal courts themselves must make greater use of the
certification procedure, a mechanism by which federal courts can
"certify" questions of state law to be authoritatively construed by the
appropriate state supreme court. Third, state high courts need to help
stem the bleeding. This Article suggests that state supreme courts follow
the framework developed by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Kahn v.
Griffin,3 5 where the court provided a clear and principled roadmap for
interpreting provisions of the Minnesota Constitution more expansively
than the United States Constitution.3 6 This framework should be
imported into the civil rights arena. Finally, Congress and state
legislatures should act to create a scheme where state supreme courts
Northern v. White, 68 LA. L. REv. 1025, 1030 (2008) (the Eighth Circuit adopted the most
conservative view for redress in employer action cases); Howard J.Bashman, 8th Circuit's Bush
Appointees

Confound

the

Prognosticators, Law.com,

June

19,

2006,

available

at

http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=l 150448725347 (noting that this is not the "most
conservative of all the federal appellate courts," but "how conservative a particular federal appellate
court happens to be is a function of how conservative the individual judges serving on the court
are," and the most conservative and youngest appointees of Bush serve on the 8th Circuit); Matthew
H. Bosworth, "An Innate Sense of Fairness": State Responses to the U.S. Supreme Court's
Sovereign Immunity Decisions, 36 PUBLIUS 393 (June 22, 2006) ("[t]he relatively conservative

Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals may have influenced this assessment"). This combination made
Minnesota an ideal test case for critically examining whether its civil rights laws were being
adequately applied and enforced in federal court. Second, we live and work in Minnesota, and thus
have a better grasp of Minnesota law over the law of any other state. Finally, it made sense as a
practical matter to narrow our focus to a single state in order to keep the Article from becoming
bogged down in hundreds of statutes from dozens of states. We will leave it to other commentators
to support (or contradict) our findings with data from other states.
35. 701 N.W.2d 815 (Minn. 2005).

36.

See id. at 828-29.
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could review questions of state law appealed from United States Courts
of Appeals. Working together, these structural reforms should restore
state civil rights law to its rightful place as a primary protector of
individual rights.
I. COMPARING STATE AND FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS

The United States and Minnesota each have a discrete set of antidiscrimination statutes. Some common examples of federal civil rights
statutes include Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"),
which generally forbids discrimination on the basis of race, color,
national origin, sex, and religion, 37 the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA"), which bans discrimination because of
age,38 and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), which prohibits
a wide range of discrimination aimed at persons with disabilities. 39 The
Minnesota Human Rights Act is Minnesota's comprehensive civil rights
statute.40 It generally proscribes any discrimination based on race,
national origin, color, religion, sex, age, status with regard to public
assistance, disability, marital status, or sexual orientation. 4 1 The goal of
this Part is to closely examine both federal and Minnesota civil rights
laws in two areas-sexual harassment and disability discriminationand to demonstrate what many take for granted, that Minnesota civil
rights laws offer greater protection to victims of discrimination than
federal civil rights laws.
A. Sexual Harassment

1. Federal law

Federal civil rights law does not explicitly forbid sexual
harassment. Instead, the bare text of Title VII simply bans sex
discrimination: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) to -2(d) (2000).
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(l)-(3) (2000).
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)-(b) (2000).
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 363A.01 to .02 (West 2004).
See id. § 363A.02.
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of such individual's ... sex ....,42

The legislative history for sex discrimination protection under Title
VII is renowned for its lack of meaningful debate. As the Supreme
Court has noted, "the prohibition against discrimination based on sex
was added to Title VII at the last minute on the floor of the House of
Representatives., 43 According to many accounts, the one-word floor
amendment adding the word "sex" to the list of protected classifications
was a tactic by opponents to sabotage the entire bill.44 Others have
asserted that the last minute amendment was the result of a concerted
lobbying effort by a small, devoted group of women's rights activists.45
Whatever the motivation behind the last-minute amendment, there is
broad consensus that the legislative history is unusually short (especially
for landmark legislation) and mentions nothing of sexual harassment.46
On the contrary, the legislative history accompanying the floor
amendment adding "sex" to Title VII focused on more traditionaleconomic-forms of sex discrimination.4 7 In offering the amendment,
Representative Smith made this introduction:
I think we all recognize and it is indisputable fact that all throughout
industry women are discriminated against in that just generally
speaking they do not get as high compensation for their work as do the
majority sex. Now, if that is48 true, I hope that the committee chairman
will accept this amendment.

42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
43. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63 (1986) (citing 110 CONG. REC. 257784 (1964)).
44. See, e.g., CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 234 (1985) (positing that the eleventh hour
amendment was "the result of a deliberate ploy of foes of the bill to scuttle it"); GARY ORFIELD,
THE BROOKINGS INST., CONGRESSIONAL POWER: CONGRESS AND SOCIAL CHANGE 299 (1975)

("Bitter opponents of the job discrimination title . . .decided to try to load up the bill with
objectionable features that might split the coalition supporting it.").
45. See, e.g., Jo Freeman, How "'Sex" Got Into Title VII PersistentOpportunism as a Maker
of Public Policy, 9 LAW & INEQ. 163, 183 (1991) (concluding that the inclusion of the sex
discrimination ban in Title VII was "the product of a small but dedicated group of women, in and
out of Congress, who knew how to take advantage of the momentum generated by a larger social
movement to promote their own goals, and a larger group of Congressmen willing to make an
affirmative statement in favor of women's rights").
46. See 110 CONG. REC. 2577-84 (1964); see also John B. Attanasio, Equal Justice Under
Chaos: The Developing Law of Sexual Harassment, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 2 n.5 (1982) ("None of
the voluminous legislative history of Title VII or its 1972 Amendments specifically pertains to
sexual harassment.").
47. See IIOCONG.REC.2577-84(1964).
48. 110 CONG. REC. 2577(1964).
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Since 1964, federal law has simply forbidden discrimination
"because of ...sex." 49 For over twenty years after the passage of Title
VII, the lower federal courts quarreled among themselves over whether a
plaintiff complaining of hostile work environment sexual harassment
could maintain an action under Title VII. 50 For example, in 1976, the
United States District Court of New Jersey concluded that sexual
harassment was not sex discrimination within the meaning of Title VII. 5 I
The court, in Tomkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co.,52 considered
the case of Adrienne Tomkins, a woman whose male supervisor at work
subjected her to unwelcome sexual advances and physical threats.53 The
court reasoned that "[w]hile sexual desire animated the parties, or at
least one of them, the gender of each is incidental to the claim of
abuse. 54 The court then went on to note, somewhat blithely, that "if an
inebriated approach by a supervisor to a subordinate at the office
Christmas party could form the basis of a federal lawsuit for sex
discrimination if a promotion or a raise is later denied to the subordinate,
we would need 4,000 federal trial judges instead of some 400.
Notwithstanding the Tomkins decision, several lower federal courts,
starting in the early 1980s, began taking sexual harassment claims
seriously. In Bundy v. Jackson,5 6 the D.C. Circuit went out of its way to
hold that sexual harassment can violate Title VII. 57 Drawing an analogy
to racially hostile work environments, the Bundy court reasoned that:
Racial or ethnic discrimination against a company's minority clients
may reflect no intent to discriminate directly against the company's
minority employees, but in poisoning the atmosphere of employment it
violates Title VII .... How then can sexual harassment, which injects
the most demeaning sexual stereotypes into the general work
environment and which always represents an intentional assault on an

49. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
50. Compare Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943-44 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (recognizing that it is
possible to state a claim for hostile work environment sexual harassment under Title VII), with
Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D.N.J. 1976) (holding that sexual
harassment does not violate Title Vil's ban on sex discrimination), rev'd 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir.
1997).
51.

Tomkins, 422 F. Supp. at 556.

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976).
Id. at 555.
Id. at 556.
Id. at 557.
641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
Id. at 943-44.
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58
individual's innermost privacy, not be illegal?

In 1986, the Supreme Court stepped in to resolve the dispute. In
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,59 the respondent, Mechelle
Vinson, alleged that her supervisor, Sidney Taylor, perpetually made
demands for sexual favors, "fondled her in front of other employees,
followed her into the women's restroom when she went there alone,
exposed himself to her, and even forcibly raped her on several
occasions." 60 The Court rejected the view that the Title VII ban on sex
discrimination only applied to "'tangible loss' of 'an economic
character.',' 61 Rather, the Court concluded that sexual harassment62 can
create a hostile work environment, which is a violation of Title VII.
But the Meritor Court was careful to limit its holding in order to
stay true to the text of Title VII, which after all, does not explicitly ban
sexual harassment.6 3 First, the Court held that any claim of sexual
harassment must prove that the harassment was "sufficiently severe or
pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment .

. . ."64

The Supreme Court went even further in Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton,65 where it declared that "[w]e have made it clear that conduct
must be extreme to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of
employment ....,,66
Lower courts evaluating sexual harassment claims
after Meritor have typically examined the level of offensiveness of the
unwelcome acts or words, the frequency of the harassing encounters, the
length of time over which the harassment occurred,
and the surrounding
67
of.
complained
acts
or
words
the
context of
Second, the Court in Meritor held that the complaining party must
demonstrate that the harassment has "create[d] an abusive working
environment., 68 The lower federal courts have interpreted this element

58. Id. at 945.
59. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
60. Id. at 59-60.
61. Id. at 64 (citation omitted).
62. Id. at 65-66.
63. See id. (explaining that it is the EEOC Guidelines which establish the view that sexual
harassment violates Title VII).
64. Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11 th Cir. 1982)).
65. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
66. Id. at 788 (emphasis added).
67. See generally Nitsche v. CEO of Osage Valley Elec. Coop., 446 F.3d 841, 846 (8th Cir.
2006) (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)) (outlining multiple elements to
consider when viewing the totality of the circumstances in order to determine whether a work
environment was sufficiently hostile under Title VII).
68. Meritor,477 U.S. at 67 (citing Henson, 682 F.2d at 904).
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to require victims of discrimination to show that the working
environment was both objectively and subjectively offensive. 69 Inother
words, the working environment must be offensive to both the
7
reasonable person 70 and the victim of the harassment him- or herself. '
Third, the victim of discrimination must show that the harassment
complained of was "unwelcome. 7 2 And finally, the party claiming
harassment must show that the alleged harassment was based on sex (as
in, gender), and not on some other neutral characteristic.73 For example,
the "equal opportunity . . . harasser"-the supervisor who doles out

harassment equally to men and women-is generally immune from a
Title VII sexual harassment suit, since it cannot be argued that the
supervisor acted because of sex. 7 4 These four elements continue to serve
as the guideposts for establishing a sexual harassment claim under Title
5
7

VII.

2. Minnesota Law
Like its federal counterpart, the Minnesota Human Rights Act bans
a wide range of discrimination based on sex. 76 Unlike Title VII,
however, the Minnesota Human Rights Act explicitly defines and
forbids sexual harassment. Minnesota defines sexual harassment as
follows:

69. See, e.g., Faragher,524 U.S. at 787 (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22); Nitsche, 446 F.3d
at 846 (citing Faragher,524 U.S. at 787).
70. The Ninth Circuit differs slightly from the other federal circuits in that the Ninth Circuit
uses a "reasonable woman" standard. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878-80 (9th Cir.
1991) (citations omitted).
71. See, e.g., Nitsche, 446 F.3d at 846 (citing Faragher,524 U.S. at 787).
72. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (2008)) ("The gravamen of any
sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were 'unwelcome."').
73. See id. at 64-66.
74. See, e.g., Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 403 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that a supervisor
who solicited sex from both male and female subordinates could not be liable under Title VII).
75. See Nitsche, 446 F.3d at 845 (citing McCown v. St. John's Health Sys., Inc., 349 F.3d
540, 542 (8th Cir. 2003)).
76. Specifically, the Minnesota Human Rights Act states that:
Except when based on a bona fide occupational qualification, itis an unfair employment
practice for an employer, because of... sex ... to:
(a) refuse to hire or to maintain a system of employment which unreasonably excludes a
person seeking employment; or
(b) discharge an employee; or
(c) discriminate against a person with respect to hiring, tenure, compensation, terms,
upgrading, conditions, facilities, or privileges of employment.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.08 subdiv. 2 (West 2004).
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"Sexual harassment" includes unwelcome sexual advances, requests

for sexual favors, sexually motivated physical contact or other verbal
or physical conduct or communication of a sexual nature when:
(1) submission to that conduct or communication is made a term or
condition, either explicitly or implicitly, of obtaining employment,

public accommodations or public services, education, or housing;

(2) submission to or rejection of that conduct or communication by an
individual is used as a factor in decisions affecting that individual's
employment, public accommodations or public services, education, or
housing; or

(3) that conduct or communication has the purpose or effect of
substantially interfering with an individual's employment, public
accommodations or public services, education, or housing, or creating

an

intimidating,

accommodations,
77

hostile,
public

or

offensive

services,

employment,

educational,

or

public
housing

environment.

This Article will take up the task of contrasting Minnesota's sexual
harassment statute with Title VII in a moment. First, it is important to
tell the story of how Minnesota got to this point. In 1964, when
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Minnesota had no law
addressing sex discrimination or sexual harassment.78 Prior to 1964,
only two states-Hawaii and Wisconsin-outlawed sex discrimination.79
Inspired by the new federal law, local reformers convinced the
Minnesota legislature to add "sex" as a suspect classification to its civil
rights laws in 1969. 80 The early act dealt only with employment, but
clearly and forcefully laid out its legislative mandate: "The opportunity
to obtain employment without discrimination because
of sex is also
81
hereby recognized as and declared to be a civil right."
As the debate over sexual harassment in the workplace began to
take hold in the late 1970s, the Minnesota Supreme Court accepted
77. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.03 subdiv. 43 (West 2004).
78. See Freeman, supra note 45, at 163.
79. Id.
80. See Act of June 6, 1969, ch. 975, 1969 Minn. Laws 1937, 1938-39 (codified at MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 363A.08 (West 2004)).
81. Id. at 1948.
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review of a case in 1980-six years before the U.S. Supreme Court
would do so-to determine whether sexual harassment was actionable
under Minnesota law. 82 The Minnesota Supreme Court, in Continental
Can Co. v. State,83 answered that question in the affirmative. 8 ' At the
time of the Continental Can decision, the Minnesota Human Rights Act
prohibited only discrimination because of sex-not sexual harassment-much like Title VII does today.85
In 1982, Minnesota law and federal law parted ways when the
Minnesota legislature added the specific ban on sexual harassment,
including the definition of sexual harassment discussed above.8 6 The
legislative history of the change reveals two purposes in pushing for
comprehensive legislation on sexual harassment. First, it establishes that
the legislature wanted to codify the basic holding in Continental Can--87
that sexual harassment is actionable discrimination--into statutory law.
Second, the legislative history displays numerous instances where
Minnesota legislators expressed an intention to go beyond what was
For example, Representative
already protected by federal law.
Rodriguez helped prepare a report on sexual harassment that would later
form the basis for the legislative change. 88 The report noted that under
federal anti-discrimination law, an employee would need to show that
the sexual harassment affected the "terms and conditions of employment
and that these effects were directly linked to sexual harassment." 89 The
report further commented on the state of federal law in 1980, stating that
"if the 'employer can show that there were other reasons for adverse

82. See Cont'l Can Co. v. State, 297 N.W.2d 241, 243, 246-47 (Minn. 1980); see also Meritor
Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
83. 297 N.W.2d 241 (Minn. 1980).
84. Id. at 249.
85. Compare MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subdiv. l(2)(b) & (c) (1978) ("[l~t is an unfair
employment practice: ... (2) For an employer, because of ...sex ... (b) to discharge an employee

...or (c) to discriminate against an employee with respect to his hire, tenure, compensation, (or)
upgrading ... of employment."), with Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) ("It shall
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer - (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's... sex ....
86. Act of Mar. 23, 1982, 1982 Minn. Laws 1511.
87. Bradley A. Kletscher, Minnesota's Sexual Harassment Statute: It's [sic] History and the
law (Part 1), http://www.bgs.com/default.asp?id=80 (last visited Nov. 1, 2008) (statement of Rep.
Rodriguez) ("The prohibition against sex discrimination in the state human rights act includes
sexual harassment directed at an employee by fellow employees which impacts a condition of
employment... " (quoting Cont'l Can, 297 N.W.2d at 249 (Minn. 1980))); see Act of Mar. 23,
1982, ch. 618, 1982 Minn. Laws 1508.
88. Kletscher, supra note 87.
89. Id. (citations omitted).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2008

13

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 14
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLO YMENT LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 26:63

employment action, such as excessive absenteeism or poor work
performance, the courts have held that sexual harassment did not
constitute sex discrimination under Title VII.' 90
This legislative history is notable for three reasons. First, it makes
little sense to argue that the Minnesota legislature wanted to simply
codify Continental Can without expanding on the decision. Why would
a legislature take the time and effort to amend a statute to reflect a
controlling supreme court decision when it could achieve the same result
by doing nothing? Second, the passing references to federal law in the
legislative history indicate a dissatisfaction with the level of protection
Title VII offered victims of sexual harassment in 1980. And third, the
resulting text of the Minnesota Human Rights Act after the amendment
confirms the view that the legislature wished to provide a relatively
more expansive definition of sexual harassment.
3. Comparing Federal Law with Minnesota Law
In making the comparison between the Minnesota Human Rights
Act and Title VII, Minnesota's law is more expansive is several ways.
First, Minnesota's sexual harassment law is textually grounded, while
federal law does not explicitly ban sexual harassment. 9 Instead, federal
law relies on judicial interpretation, with its "severe or pervasive"
92
requirement necessary to remain faithful to the text of the statute.
Second, the Minnesota Human Rights Act contains an explicit rule
of construction instructing courts that "[t]he provisions of this chapter
shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the purposes
thereof. 9 3 Although the Supreme Court often mentions the "remedial
purpose" of Title VII, 94 there is no textual provision of Title VII
mentioning a liberal construction of the federal statute. 95
Third, many of the doctrinal developments developed in Meritor
and after do not seem to apply to Minnesota's law. For example, the
Meritor Court held that the sexual harassment must be "sufficiently
severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment

90.

Id. (citations omitted).

91.
92.

See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64-66 (1986).
Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (1982)).

93. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.04 (West 2004).
94. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 121 (2002) (citing Zipes v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 398 (1982)).
95. See generally Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a-2000h-6 (2000).
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...
"' in order to be covered by Title VII. 96 This is simply not required
under Minnesota law. Although subsections (1) and (2) of Minnesota's
sexual harassment definition deal with terms and conditions,97
subsection (3) does not. The third subsection bans "conduct or
communication [which] has the purpose or effect of substantially
interfering with an individual's employment, public accommodations or
public services, education, or housing, or creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive employment, public accommodations, public
services, educational, or housing environment." 98 On the face of the
statute, liability can attach for "substantially interfering with an
individual's employment," or for "creating an intimidating, hostile or
offensive . . .environment." 99

Also, culpable behavior includes that

which has the "purpose or effect" of bringing about these situations.'0 °
The plain reading of the statute simply does not require that the
harassment be "severe or pervasive," nor does the statute necessarily
require that the alleged harassment affect a term or condition of
employment.101

Fourth, the Court in Meritor held that the complaining party must
demonstrate that the harassment has "create[d] an abusive working
environment,"1 °2 which requires a showing that the working
environment is both objectively and subjectively offensive. 0 3 In other
words, the working environment must be offensive to both the
reasonable person, and the victim of the harassment him- or herself.104
But the Minnesota definition of sexual harassment does not appear to
require a showing of subjective offensiveness. °5 Why else would the
Minnesota Human Rights Act forbid "conduct or communication
[which] has the purpose . . . of substantially interfering with an

individual's employment

.

. .,?106

The only possible situation where a

96. Meritor,477 U.S. at 67 (alteration in original) (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904).
97. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.03 subdivs. 43(l)-(2) (West 2004).
98. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.03. subdiv. 43(3).
99. Id. (emphasis added).
100. Id. (emphasis added).
101. Compare MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.03 subdiv. 42(l)-(3) (containing no minimum
standard for a harassment claim), with Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904)
(establishing that sexual harassment must be "severe or pervasive" to be actionable).
102. Meritor,477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904).
103. See, e.g., Nitsche v. CEO of Osage Valley Elec. Coop., 446 F.3d 841, 846 (8th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998)).
104.

Id.

105. See generally MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.03 subdiv. 43(l)-(3) (containing no requirement
of subjective offensiveness in defining "Sexual Harassment").
106. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03A subdiv. 43(3) (emphasis added).
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would-be harasser manifests the purpose but not the effect (only one of
which is required) of creating a hostile workplace environment is that of
the unsuccessful harasser: the manager who attempts to sexually harass a
subordinate worker but is laughed off as joking or harmless. In such a
situation, the would-be victim is clearly not subjectively offended by the
manager's conduct, but if the manager acted with purpose of sexually
harassing the subordinate employee, then the conduct qualifies as sexual
harassment under the Minnesota definition.10 7
Moving beyond the "unsuccessful harasser," the Title VII
requirement of subjective offensiveness can cause problems for victims
of harassment. As an evidentiary matter, it is usually not enough for
such victims to state in a deposition or to testify at trial that they were
subjectively offended. 10 8 Take the case of Cottrillv. MFA, 10 9 where the
Eighth Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of the
employer because the plaintiffs, a group of women, were not
subjectively offended (according to the court) by their employer's
behavior." 0 According to the Cottrill court, the plaintiffs did not show
sufficient evidence that they were subjectively offended by their
supervisor's behavior, which included spying on the women in the

107. Although we conclude that the Minnesota Human Rights Act does not require a showing
of subjective offensiveness, two outlier Minnesota courts have endorsed subjective offensiveness as
an element of a sexual harassment claim under the Minnesota Human Rights Act. These courts are
in error. The first to mention the requirement was the court in Police Officers Federation of
Minneapolis v. City of Minneapolis.No. C4-99-2041, 2000 WL 719860 at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. June
6, 2000) (unpublished opinion). The court in Police Officers Federation cited another Minnesota
Court of Appeals case, Johns v. Harborage1, LTD, which merely recited the Title VII standard. Id.
(citing Johns, 585 N.W.2d 853, 861 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66)).
Thus, Police Officers Federation'sreliance on precedent was misplaced. The second Minnesota
court to explicitly require a showing of subjective offensiveness is another unpublished, and thus
not precedential, opinion, Monson v. Northern HabilitativeServices, Inc. No. A05-1102, 2006 WL
771919 at *7 (Minn. Ct. App. May 24, 2006) (unpublished opinion). Like the Police Officers
Federationcourt, the court in Monson applied the wrong precedent. Monson cited the Minnesota
Supreme Court case of Goins v. West Group, 635 N.W.2d 717, 724-25 (Minn. 2001), where the
Supreme Court adopted the Title VII offensiveness standards for hostile work environment claims
based on the plaintiffs sexual orientation. Id. (quoting Faragher,524 U.S. at 787). The Goins
opinion had nothing to do with sexual harassment. See Goins, 635 N.w.2d at 720. The Monson
court was wrong to import the standards from a sexual orientation case to a sexual harassment case,
because Minnesota sexual harassment cases are decided under Minnesota's detailed sexual
orientation statute. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.08 subdiv. 1 ("Except when based on a
bona fide occupational qualification, it is an unfair employment practice for a labor organization,
because of ... sexual orientation .... ").

108. See, e.g., Cottrill v. MFA, Inc., 443 F.3d 629, 636-37 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding that in order
to be subjectively offensive, the plaintiff must be aware of the activity at the time it was occurring).
109. 443 F.3d 629 (8th Cir. 2006).
110. Id. at 636, 638-39.
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bathroom, and planting urine, an unidentified sticky substance, and what
was believed to be poison ivy on the women's toilet seats, leading to
severe, painful, and, in one case permanent rashes and other skin
conditions.1 11 Such evidentiary burdens should not present problems
under Minnesota law, however, since victims of discrimination need not
show, under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, that the behavior
complained of is subjectively offensive.
Fifth (and last), under federal law, the party claiming harassment
must show that the alleged harassment was based on sex, and not on
some other neutral characteristic. 1 2 But again, Minnesota does not
follow this requirement. The Minnesota Supreme Court explicitly
rejected this requirement in Cummings v. Koehnen, 113 where the Court
held that sexual harassment need not affect one sex more than the
other.1 14 The court reasoned that:
Requiring a plaintiff to show that conduct . . . resulted in the

differential treatment of male and female employees would lead to
absurd results. Such a requirement would leave two classes of
employees unprotected from sexual harassment in the workplace:
employees who work in a single-gender workplace and employees who
work with an "equal opportunity harasser," who harasses sexually both
males and females. There is nothing in the [Minnesota Human Rights
Act] to indicate the legislature intended to leave these classes of
employees unprotected, and we cannot presume the legislature
intended such an absurd result.115
Importantly, the Minnesota Supreme Court accepted in Cummings
the notion that the Minnesota Human Rights Act's sexual harassment
provisions outlawed more conduct than did the simple ban on sex
discrimination in effect in Minnesota between 1969 and 1982.116 The
appellant in Cummings cited Continental Can "for the proposition that
sexual harassment must have a disparate effect on one gender to be
actionable under the Minnesota Human Rights Act.""' 7 The Court
rejected this argument, noting that "Continental Can interpreted an
111.
112.
113.
114.

See id. at631-33,638-39,641.
See id. at 636 (citing Schoffstall v. Henderson, 223 F.3d 818, 826-27 (8th Cir. 2000)).
568 N.W.2d 418 (Minn. 1997).
See id. at 422, 424.

115. Id. at 422-23 (citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 645.17(1) (West 2004) (requiring that when
interpreting statutes, there must be a presumption by the courts that "the legislature did not intend a
result that is absurd")).
116. Seeid. at423-24.
117. Id.at423n.6.
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earlier version of the [Minnesota Human Rights Act], and is therefore
not dispositive of the issue before us. At the time Continental Can was
decided, the [Minnesota Human Rights Act] did not prohibit sexual
harassment specifically." ' 8 The court went on to conclude that given
the statutory definition of sexual harassment under the current
Minnesota Human Rights Act, the legislature did not intend for victims
of sexual harassment
to prove that the harassment was aimed at one
9
11
sex.
particular
In sum, the Minnesota Human Rights Act affords victims of
discrimination greater substantive protections when compared to federal
law. Minnesota law contains a textual ban on sexual harassment, a
clause directing courts to interpret the statute liberally, no requirement
that the harassment be "extreme," "severe or pervasive," or "affect a
term or condition of employment," no requirement that the complaining
party prove he or she was subjectively offended, and, finally, no
requirement that the victim demonstrate that the harasser makes a
disparate impact on one sex over the other.
B. DisabilityDiscrimination
Sexual harassment is not the exclusive area where Minnesota's civil
rights laws offer greater protection than their federal counterparts.
Minnesota also offers broader protection for the disabled. This extra
protection is largely accomplished by defining a much larger group of
people as "disabled," as compared to federal law.
1. Federal Disability Law
Federal law defines disability as: "a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual; a record of such an impairment; or being regarded as having
such an impairment."'' 20 Although this definition comes from the ADA,
which Congress passed in 1990,121 the definition of "disability" was
drawn nearly verbatim from the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.2

The

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") has issued
118. Id.

119. See id. at 424.
120.
121.
(codified
122.

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000).
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990)
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12300 (2000)).
29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(B) (2000).
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guidelines to help define the
According to the EEOC,

concept

of "substantially

limits."

the term "substantially limits" means: [u]nable to perform a major life
activity that the average person in the general population can perform;
or [s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration
under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity
as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the
average person
in the general population can perform that same major
23
life activity.'

Since the ADA was passed, the federal courts have interpreted the

"substantially limits"

requirement strictly, drastically limiting the
number of people who qualify for protection under the ADA. For

example, in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,' 24 the Supreme Court ruled
that two severely myopic twin sisters were not disabled within the
meaning of the ADA because their vision problems did not
"substantially limit" the sisters' major life activity of working. 25 The
Court went on to note that the "substantially limits" requirement meant
' 126
that the sisters must be unable to "work in a broad class of jobs."
Similarly, in Murphy v. United ParcelService, Inc.,127 the Court rejected
the plaintiffs argument that he was disabled because his
high blood
12 8
pressure kept him from doing his job as a UPS mechanic.
The Supreme Court has further narrowed the scope of the ADA's
coverage by holding that a person's corrective measures must be taken
into account before determining whether that person is disabled. 29 In
Sutton, the Court explicitly held that "if a person is taking measures to
correct for, or mitigate, a physical or mental impairment, the effects of
those measures .

.

. must be taken into account when judging whether

that person is 'substantially limited' in a major life activity and thus
'disabled' under the [ADA]." 3 ° Finally, in 2002, the Supreme Court

123.
124.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)-(ii) (2007).
527 U.S. 471 (1999).

125. Id. at 475, 488-89, 492-93.
126. Id.at 491.
127.
128.
129.

527 U.S. 516 (1999).
Id. at 519, 521.
See Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565 (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482);
see also Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521.

130. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482; see also Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 565-66 (reasoning that the
extent to which a person has learned to compensate for his limitation by making subconscious
adjustments should be considered in deciding whether the person is disabled within the meaning of
the ADA).
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gave the ADA its stingiest construction yet, holding that a plaintiff
invoking the ADA's protection "must have an impairment that prevents
or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of a

central importance to most people's lives." '31
Several commentators have criticized these decisions for narrowing
the scope of the ADA beyond recognition. 132 Some commentators have
reached the conclusion that the Supreme Court's recent ADA
jurisprudence is so out of balance that only immediate legislative action
by Congress can save the ADA. 133 Very recently, Congress amended the
ADA to effectively legislatively reverse some of the Supreme Court's
interpretations of the law. The ADA Amendments Act of 2008134
("ADAAA"), which took effect January 1, 2009, has directed courts to

ignore most mitigating measures when evaluating whether a particular
person is disabled. The ADAAA also "reject[ed] the standards
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Toyota Motor Manufacturing,
Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams... that the terms 'substantially' and 'major'
in the definition of disability under the ADA 'need to be interpreted

strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled...
,,,135

It is too early to gauge the effect of the new law. But it is worth
noting, as a general matter, that piecemeal legislative fixes to civil rights
laws are a limited remedy for narrow judicial interpretation. First, such
changes are relatively rare. Second, civil rights amendments can exact a

131. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 195-98 (2002) (emphasis added)
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000).
132. See, e.g., Waterstone, supra note 10, at 448; Robert Burgdorf, Jr., "Substantially Limited"
Protectionfrom Disability Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of
the Definition of Disability, 42 VILL. L. REV. 409, 539 (1997) (discussing the courts'
misapprehension of the ADA's definition of disability); Aviam Soifer, The Disability Term:
Dignity, Default, and Negative Capability,47 UCLA L. REV. 1279, 1299-1308 (2000) (detailing the
federal courts' restrictive interpretations of the definition of disability); Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The
Supreme Court's Definition of Disability Under the ADA: A Return to the Dark Ages, 52 ALA. L.
REV. 321, 325 (2000) (recounting the legislative history supporting defining disability without
regard to mitigating measures).
133. See NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, RIGHTING THE ADA 99-123 (2004), available at
(calling for an "ADA
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2004/pdf/rightingada.pdf
Restoration Act," and pointing out that "[i]ncisive and forceful legislative action is needed to
address the dramatic narrowing and weakening of the protection provided by the ADA "); see also
Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What
Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It? 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 91-92, 162
(2000) (suggesting that Congress should amend the definition of disability found in the ADA).
134. Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C § 12101, and 29
U.S.C. § 705 (2008)).
135. Id.
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political toll on members of Congress who answer to business and other
interests. Finally, and most fundamentally, such remedial legislation
does nothing more than plug a few holes. The underlying problem-the
interpretive methodology that leads many jurists to interpret civil rights
laws narrowly remains in effect.
2. Minnesota Disability Law
Minnesota first banned discrimination on the basis of disability in
1973,136 the same year Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
Initially, Minnesota law defined the term "disability" more or less
identically to federal law. 137 But in 1989, one year before the passage of
the ADA, the Minnesota legislature made a one word change to the
definition of disability in the Minnesota Human Rights Act. 13' The
legislature changed the definition from "substantially limiting a major
life activity" to "materially limiting a major life activity. 1 39 So how
much difference can one word make? A lot, it turns out.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has confirmed that the Minnesota
legislature intended to depart from the federal definition of disability and
define the term more expansively. 140 In the words of the Minnesota
Supreme Court, "The [Minnesota Human Rights Act] originally required
the impairment to substantially limit one or more life activities. In 1989,
the legislature amended the word substantially to materially, thus
lowering the standard in which the impairment impacts on one or more
life activities. This standard now is different from the applicable federal
standard."' 14 1 The Minnesota Supreme Court applied this broad
definition in Hoover v. Norwest Private Mortgage Banking,142 where the
court held that fibromyalgia qualified as a disability under Minnesota

136. Act of May 21, 1973, ch. 729, 1973 Minn. Laws 2161-66.
137. Compare sec. I subdiv. 25 (defining disability as "a mental or physical condition which
constitutes a handicap"), with Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) (defining disability

as "physical or mental impairment that constitutes or results in substantial impairment to
employment").
138. Sigurdson v. Carl Bolander & Sons, Co., 532 N.w.2d 225, 228 n.3 (Minn. 1995) (citing
Act of May 25, 1989, ch. 280 § 1, 1989 Minn. Laws. 1099, 1100 (1989)); Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
12101-12300 (2000)).
139. Sigurdson, 532 N.W.2d at 228 n.3; see also Robert Whereatt, Legislators Gave Disabled
People New Protections,Accommodations, STAR TRIBUNE, May 26, 1989 (explaining the effect of
the changes to the Minnesota Human Rights Act).
140. See Sigurdson, 532 N.W.2d at 228 & 228 n.3.

141.

Id.at228n.3.

142.

632 N.W.2d 534 (Minn. 2001).
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law, even though the same43 condition often failed to qualify as a
disability under federal law. 1
Held up together, Minnesota and federal disability laws are two
ships moving in opposite directions. While the Minnesota legislature
has acted to broaden the definition of disability in Minnesota, the
Supreme Court has acted to narrow the definition of disability under
federal law.
By highlighting these two discrete areas of anti-discrimination
law-sexual harassment and disability discrimination-we do not mean
to provide an exhaustive list areas where Minnesota civil rights law
provides greater protection to plaintiffs than federal civil rights law.
These areas are illustrative. They serve as examples, meant to shed light
on a basic truth: held together, Minnesota's civil rights laws offer more
depth, breadth, and scope of substantive protection than analogous
federal laws.
II. THE UNDER-ENFORCEMENT OF MINNESOTA'S CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS IN
FEDERAL COURTS

Consider the story of Rashid Arraleh, a black Muslim immigrant
from Somalia. 144 Mr. Arraleh brought a claim for harassment because of
45
race and national origin in the Federal District Court of Minnesota.'
According to Arraleh, during the six months he worked for Ramsey
County in St. Paul, he was subjected to a hostile and offensive work
environment.146 Among the litany of comments directed at Arraleh or
made in his presence:

143.

*

"Today, your skin doesn't look as white as it normally does";

"

Being referred to as "Mr. Cocoa";

*

"Is your hair for real?";

*

"It's very difficult to work with you people";

*

African-Americans are "very difficult to work with" because

See id. at 543 n.5, 544 (Minn. 2001) (citations omitted).

144. See Arraleh v. County of Ramsey, 461 F.3d 967, 971 (8th Cir. 2006).
145. Id. at 970-71.
146. Id. at 970-73, 980.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol26/iss1/14

22

Smith and Hansen: Federalism's False Hope: How State Civil Rights Laws Are Systemat

2008]

FEDERALISM'S FALSE HOPE

they are "very emotional" and "take things too personally";
*

"

"[B]lack people are expected to leave their blackness
behind"; 147and
' 148
"Giving [Arraleh] a job is like raising terrorist kids."

Like many litigants, Arraleh brought discrimination claims under
both state and federal law.1 49 This is not surprising. The somewhat
complex rules of jurisdiction in civil rights cases dictate that most cases
will end up in federal court.150 If a plaintiff has both federal and state
causes of action arising out of the same set of factual circumstances (in
this case, the hostile work environment), the plaintiff must bring all his
claims in one lawsuit, or else the latent claims will be forfeited.' 51 For
example, Arraleh could not bring a discrimination suit in federal court
based on federal civil rights law, lose, and then simply file another suit
in state court alleging state causes of action. The doctrine of res judicata
would bar the second suit. 152 This is not to say that federal law and state
law would always yield the same result, but rather that if a plaintiff
invokes the power of the courts to resolve a dispute, he should bring all
his potential claims together in one forum, rather than piecemeal. This
res judicata concern may explain why most victims of discrimination
bring claims under both federal and state law where both are
available. 153 Many plaintiffs file in federal court. Others end up in
federal court when the defendant removes the action. 54 Because of
147. Id. at 978 n.4, 980 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 973.
149. Id. at 970-71.
150. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (a) (2000) (discussing the complex rules of civil rights jurisdiction
and the impact on federal versus state jurisdiction).
151. See, e.g., Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1982) (holding that
seeking review of an administrative decision in state court on the plaintiff's civil rights charge
barred a subsequent federal suit).
152. See id. at 463, 466-67, 485.
153. See Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 73 P.3d 325, 332 (Utah 2003) (articulating the elements
and concerns of res judicata). See also Sandra F. Sperino, RecreatingDiversity in Employment Law
by Debunking the Myth of the McDonnell DouglasMonolith, 44 Hous. L. REv. 349, 353-60 (2007)

(discussing discrimination under both state and federal law).
154. Defendants have the power to "remove" cases originally filed in state court to federal
court in most civil rights actions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2000). "[A]ny civil action brought in a
State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be

removed by the defendant or defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and
division embracing the place where such action is pending." Id. In other words, defendants can
remove to federal courts if there is diversity of citizenship between the parties, see 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a) (2000), or a federal question involved, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Put another way, it is only the
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these procedural rules, many discrimination claims based on state law
theories end up litigated in federal court.155
In the end, Arraleh lost his court battle when the Eighth Circuit
ruled that no reasonable juror could conclude that Arraleh was subjected
to a racially hostile work environment, 156 an inappropriate

57

but

unsurprising result. But here comes the interesting part. Throughout the
main text of Eighth Circuit's opinion, there is no reference to Arraleh's
state law discrimination claims. 158 The court simply disposes of
Arraleh's federal claims one by one. 159 However, within a footnote to
the opinion's one line conclusion, the court begins and ends its
discussion of state law: "Because [Arraleh's] claims under the Missouri
Human Rights Act are premised on the same factual bases as his
[federal] claims, they must also fail."1 60 What's troubling is that Arraleh
did not bring any claims under the Missouri Human Rights Act. He
brought several claims under the Minnesota Human Rights Act. 16 This
makes sense, after all, since Arraleh worked for Ramsey County, a
subdivision of the state of Minnesota.
It would be easy to cast the Arraleh court's mistake as a one-time
mess-up-a cut-and-paste error, maybe the handiwork of a law clerk
working long hours at the federal courthouse. However, in federal court,
such carelessness and utter disregard for the primacy of state law is not
the exception; it is the rule. A casual flip through the pages of the
Federal Reporter seems to reveal a disturbing trend: again and again,
when victims of discrimination press their claims in federal court,
federal judges refuse to treat state civil rights laws seriously, as an
independent body of legal rules.1 62 Instead, these judges prefer to treat
state civil rights law as coextensive with federal law (often incorrectly

rare case where (1) the plaintiff files suit in state court, (2) there is no diversity between the parties,
and (3) no federal question is raised, that the defendant would lack the power to remove the action

to federal court.
155. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000) (granting federal courts supplementary jurisdiction over
pendent state law claims).
156.

See Arraleh v. County of Ramsey, 461 F.3d 967, 980 (8th Cir. 2006). The Eighth Circuit

upheld a grant of summary judgment in favor of Ramsey County, concluding that no reasonable
juror could conclude that Arraleh was subjected to a racially hostile work environment. See id.
157. Id. at 980 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
158. See id. at 970-80 (citations omitted) (discussing only the federal law claim).
159. See id. at 974-80 (citation omitted).
160.

Id. at 980 n.5 (quoting Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1137 (8th Cir. 1999)

(analyzing a claim brought under the Missouri Human Rights Act and the ADA)).
161. Id.at970-71.
162.

Federal judges are required to faithfully apply the substance of state laws. See Erie R.R.

Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 (1938).
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so, and usually without any analysis or justification for the practice).
Oftentimes, federal courts seem to ignore state law altogether.
This Part seeks to move beyond anecdotes and provide concrete
evidence that federal courts systematically under enforce Minnesota's
civil rights laws.
A. Methodology
The basic methodology of this Article's analysis is simple. Our
goal was to locate and code every Eighth Circuit decision between 1990
and 2007 that decided any issue under both federal and Minnesota civil
rights law. 163 After locating the relevant decisions, we coded each
decision along two dimensions.' 64 First, did Minnesota law and federal
law yield the same result or a different result? If the results were
different, which law offered broader protection? Second, what depth of
treatment was given to state law in the court's analysis? In answering
this second question, we grouped the cases into three categories: a full
and separate analysis of state law, a "collapsed" analysis of state law,
meaning the court simply asserts, as the Arraleh court did, that state law
issues are decided under federal standards, and, finally, no analysis of
165
state law.
B. Results
The results are damning. In no case did the Minnesota Human
Rights Act perform any better than its federal counterpart. Surprisingly,
two cases, representing less than 2% of the total cases reviewed, actually
held that the Minnesota Human Rights Act protected fewer substantive
rights than federal law. The first is Bevan v. Honeywell, Inc.,166 where
the Eighth Circuit affirmed a verdict for the plaintiff on a claim brought

163.

We performed the initial task of locating these decisions by conducting a Westlaw search

in the Eight Circuit's database for "Minnesota Human Rights Act," and then weeding out each case
that did not directly address an issue under both the Minnesota Human Rights Act and its federal
analogue.
164.

This coding process is inherently subjective.

We did our best to stay true to the

descriptive characteristics of the categories.
165. See Arraleh, 461 F.3d at 974-75, 977, 980 n.5. We are drawing conclusions about the
federal court's interpretation of state law based on how one particular court has interpreted the law
of one specific state. We make the assumption that this sample is somewhat representative of larger
national trends. Others are encouraged to replicate this methodology using other courts and other
bodies of state law.
166.

118 F.3d 603 (8th Cir. 1997).
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under the ADEA and also affirmed a verdict for the defendant on a claim
167
of age discrimination arising under the Minnesota Human Rights Act.
Both claims arose out of the same set of facts. 168 The second case is
Todd v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 169 where the Eighth Circuit interpreted the
Minnesota Human Rights Act to impose a more stringent standard for
showing an employer defendant's vicarious liability (as compared to
federal law) in a sexual harassment case. 70 The Todd court's cramped
reading of Minnesota's civil rights laws directly led to an amendment by
the Minnesota legislature in 2001, which had the result of legislatively
7
reversing the Todd decision insofar as it interpreted Minnesota law.' '
The primary result is this: in not a single case did the Eighth
Circuit interpret the Minnesota Human Rights Act to protect more
substantive rights than are protected by federal civil rights law.172 The
Eighth circuit approached a full depth of discussion of state law issues in
less than 3% of this type of case. In 63% of these cases, the Eighth
Circuit gave Minnesota law only a brief mention, without any
meaningful analysis. Finally, in 34% of the relevant cases, the Eighth
Circuit completely ignored state law. 173 The goal of this Article is not to
167. See id. at 612-13, 614 (citations omitted). This case may reflect more of a factual
distinction than a legal distinction. While the federal claim was tried to a jury, the state law claim
was decided by a judge. Id. at 608. It is possible that both the jury and judge applied the same legal
standards but simply reached opposite result because of divergent interpretations of the facts.
168. See id. at 605-08.
169. 138 F.3d 733 (8th Cir. 1998).
170. Id. at 737-38 (citations omitted). The Eighth Circuit originally applied the same, more
stringent, standard to both the state and federal claims. However, even after the court's decision on
the federal claim was vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court, forcing it to alter its decision on
the federal claim, the Eighth Circuit stood by its original, cramped reading of the Minnesota Human
Rights Act. Id., vacated, 525 U.S. 802 (1998), remanded to 175 F.3d 595 (8th Cir. 1999).
171. Gagliardi v. Ortho-Midwest, Inc., 733 N.W.2d 171, 176, 184 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007).
172. In a 2005 case, the Eighth Circuit invalidated an arbitration award on the grounds that the
award violated the public policy contained in the Minnesota Human Rights Act's ban on age
discrimination. Ace Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. Int'l. Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 292,
A.F.L.-C.I.O., 414 F.3d 896, 898 (8th Cir. 2005). In reaching this conclusion, the court appeared to
read the Minnesota Human Rights Act to ban so-called reverse age discrimination (favoring older
workers vis-A-vis younger workers). Id. at 901. Because the Supreme Court ruled in 2004 that the
federal ADEA did not authorize a cause of action for reverse age discrimination, see Gen. Dynamics
Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004), the Eighth Circuit by necessity interpreted the
Minnesota Human Rights Act more broadly than the ADEA. Ace Electrical is notable because this
result is highly unusual. However, we did not include Ace Electrical in our analysis because the
case did not fit our methodology: there was no plaintiff seeking the protection of both federal and
state discrimination law.
173. It is possible that in some of these decisions, the appellant did not appeal the adverse
lower court decisions made on state law grounds. In many cases, it is impossible to tell for sure
based on the court of appeals' opinion. We assume that in most cases, the appellant sought review
of both his state and federal claims.
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systematically relitigate these cases, demonstrating one by one why and

how each one erred. Rather, our goal is to look at these data in the
aggregate, and draw broad conclusions about the enforcement of state
law in federal courts.
Many of the decisions ignore distinctions between state and federal
civil rights law discussed in Part I of this Article. For example, the
Eighth Circuit regularly applies the federal standards for sexual

harassment cases to claims of sexual harassment arising under the
Minnesota Human Rights Act. 7 4 Clearwater v. Independent School
DistrictNo. 166, 'v is one such example. In that case, the Eighth Circuit
declared, quite improperly that "[Clearwater's]
hostile work
environment [sexual harassment] claim is based on Title VII and the
[Minnesota Human Rights Act]. We review these state and federal
claims under the same standards .... ,,176
There are numerous cases where the Eighth Circuit has incorrectly
applied federal standards for state law disability claims. 77 For example,
in Somers v. City of Minneapolis,'78 the Court stated that "[u]nder the
ADA, Somers is disabled if he has 'a physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
174. See, e.g., Peterson v. Scott County, 406 F.3d 515, 521 (8th Cir. 2005); Erenberg v.
Methodist Hosp., 357 F.3d 787. 792 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing Breeding v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co.,
164 F.3d 1151, 1156 (8th Cir. 1999); Hoover v. Norwest Private Mortgage Banking, 632 N.W.2d
534, 542 (Minn. 2001)); Wilson v. Brinker Int'l, Inc., 382 F.3d 765, 768 (8th Cir. 2004); Walsh v.
Nat'l Computer Sys., Inc., 332 F.3d 1150, 1154 (8th Cir. 2003); Thorn v. Amalgamated Transit
Union, 305 F.3d 826, 830 (8th Cir. 2002); Clearwater v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 166, 231 F.3d 1122,
1124 n.2 (8th Cir. 2000).
175. 231 F.3d 1122 (8th Cir. 2000).
176. Id. at 1124 n.2.
177. See, e.g., Thao v. City of St. Paul, 481 F.3d 565, 567 n.3 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing MINN.
STAT. § 363A.12, subdiv. 1; Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 912 (8th Cir. 1998); Roberts v.
KinderCare Learning Ctrs., 86 F.3d 844, 846 n.2 (8th Cir. 1996)); Liljedahl v. Ryder Student
Transp. Servs., Inc. 341 F.3d 836, 841 (8th Cir. 2003) ("Claims arising under the [Minnesota
Human Rights Act] are analyzed using the same standard applied to ADA claims.") (citations
omitted); Longen v. Waterous Co., 347 F.3d 685, 688 n.2 (8th Cir. 2003) ("The [Minnesota Human
Rights Act] parallels the ADA. Thus, we analyze the claims at the same time.") (citations omitted);
Heisler v. Metro. Council, 339 F.3d 622, 625 (8th Cir. 2003) (incorrectly asserting that "Minnesota
courts facing disability claims under the [Minnesota Human Rights Act] apply the same standards
federal courts apply to ADA claims") (quoting Somers v. City of Minneapolis, 245 F.3d 782, 788
(8th Cir. 2001)); Philip v. Ford Motor Co., 328 F.3d 1020, 1023 n.3 (8th Cir. 2003) ("Claims arising
under the [Minnesota Human Rights Act] are analyzed using the same standard applied to ADA
claims.") (citing Maziarka v. Mills Fleet Farm Inc., 245 F.3d 675, 679 n.3 (8th Cir. 2001); Fenney
v. Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. Co., 327 F.3d 707, 711 n.5 (8th Cir. 2003) ("We have noted that the
[Minnesota Human Rights Act] parallels the ADA, and thus we conclude that the District Court
properly treated Fenney's [Minnesota Human Rights Act] claim as co-extensive with his ADA
claims.") (citations omitted).
178. 245 F.3d 782 (8th Cir. 2001).
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individual' or is 'regarded as having such an impairment.' Claims under
the [Minnesota Human Rights Act] are analyzed the same as claims
under the ADA."' 179 As discussed in Part I, and contrary to the court's
assertion, disability discrimination claims brought under state law are
not analyzed using the same standards developed under federal law.
C. Analysis
These results are disturbing for several reasons. First, and most
obviously, the Eighth Circuit is often misapplying substantive Minnesota
law. But more subtly, the extremely poor depth of treatment of state law
issues is troubling and problematic-a practice evincing disrespect for
the primacy of state civil rights law. On this point, the problem goes far
beyond reaching the "correct" result in any given case; after all, a court
that happens to reach the correct result in a given case by flipping a coin
could not justify its methodology after the fact based on the correctness
of the result.
At the level of the individual plaintiff, this under-enforcement
undermines one of the primary functions of courts in society: providing
those who feel wronged with a fair hearing. 180 Even to the civil rights
plaintiff who loses his case, there is a cathartic value in airing his
grievances before a neutral decision-maker. The plaintiff can move on
knowing that his voice was heard. But when state law claims are not
treated seriously, this value is undermined. A plaintiffs original
grievance is only compounded by a sense that he was not treated fairly
in court.
At the systemic level, the under-enforcement of state civil rights
law in federal court poses further problems. First, the problem is self
perpetuating.
As a matter of precedent, the practice of underenforcement is entrenched, with each passing case supplying another
citation used to justify the practice in the next case. Second, the practice
of under-enforcement undermines the principles and values of
federalism. When Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
drafters made explicit their wish to leave budding state antidiscrimination regimes alone-not preempted in any way by federal
law.181 The practice of under-enforcement described in this Part
179.
574 (8th
180.
See U.S.
181.

Id. at 788 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); Treanor v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 200 F.3d 570,
Cir. 2000)).
The constitution guarantees every citizen's right to present a claim or defense in court.
CONST. art. III, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. VI & VII.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (2000) ("Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt
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operates as a kind of de facto federal preemption, removing the incentive
state level and undermining the
for passing civil rights legislation at the 182
states' role as laboratories of democracy.
While the under-enforcement of state civil rights law in federal
court appears prevalent as a descriptive matter, we can only speculate as
to the cause of the problem. For practicing members of the civil rights
bar, there is little incentive to spend finite time and energy separately
litigating state law claims that will not gain clients any currency above
and beyond the result that can already be achieved on the federal claims.
In several of the analyzed opinions, there are hints that the plaintiffs'
lawyers did not press their state law claims very forcefully, and in some
cases probably acquiesced to having their client's state law claims
subsumed into their federal claims. 183 Plaintiffs' lawyers' behavior in
this respect is essentially strategic. After all, these attorneys operate in
an environment that exists independently of them, and they are (and
should be) more concerned with the outcome for their particular client
than with the development of case law within the federal judiciary. This
might mean not wasting time and resources making a stink over a state
law claim, when the time and energy is better spent elsewhere. Given
federal courts poor record in interpreting state law, lawyers making such
a strategic decision seem to be vindicated.
But the civil rights bar is certainly not entirely to blame for the
under-enforcement of state civil rights laws in federal courts. The
federal courts themselves deserve a share of the blame. One possible
explanation for the under-enforcement is that federal courts are slowly
84
making a return-at least in the area of civil rights-to Swift v. Tyson,'

or relieve any person from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or

future law of any State or political subdivision of a State ....
").
182. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, From States' Rights Blues to Blue States' Rights: Federalism
After the Rehnquist Court, 75. FORDHAM L. REv. 799, 802, 808 (2006).
183. See, e.g., Fenney v. Dakota, Minnesota & E. R.R. Co., 327 F.3d 707, 711 n.5 (8th Cir.

2003) (noting that neither party contested the district court's decision to treat the Minnesota Human
Rights Act as co-extensive with the ADA) (citing Maziarka v. Mills Fleet Farm Inc., 245 F.3d 675,
678 n.3 (8th Cir. 2001)); Brief of Appellant at 1-8, Rush v. Metro. Council Transit Operations, 13 F.

App'x. 477 (8th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted) (acknowledging that both statutes are treated under
the same standards, but making no attempt to argue that the Minnesota Human Rights Act's
definition of disability is less stringent than the ADA's); Heaser v. Toro Co., 247 F.3d 826, 830 n.2
(8th Cir. 2001) ("We have noted that the [Minnesota Human Rights Act] parallels the ADA, and
neither party contests the district court's treatment of Heaser's [Minnesota Human Rights Act]
claims as co-extensive with her ADA claims.") (citing Wilking v. County of Ramsey, 153 F.3d 869,
872 (8th Cir. 1998)) (citations omitted).
184. 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
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where the Supreme Court held that federal courts hearing cases brought
under their diversity jurisdiction should develop and apply a federal
common law.' 85 Another possibility is that the federal courts are
especially likely to ignore state law in this area because the applicable
body of precedent is underdeveloped. As discussed above, many civil
rights cases end up in federal court for jurisdictional reasons, either filed
there by the plaintiff, or removed there by the defendant.' 86 Because of
this, the body of Minnesota cases authoritatively construing the
Minnesota Human Rights Act is far less developed than the Minnesota
cases interpreting contractual disputes, or tort liability, for example.
This relative scarcity of case law interpreting the Minnesota Human
Rights Act surely creates a temptation to simply follow the welldeveloped body of precedent built up over a generation of interpreting
federal anti-discrimination statutes. Finally, it is possible that some
federal judges are simply disdainful of state civil rights law.
Whatever the cause, the result is clear. By now, the practice of
under-enforcing Minnesota's civil rights law is deeply ingrained in the
federal judiciary, both psychologically and as matter of precedent.
These mutually reinforcing problems need immediate attention if
Minnesota's civil rights laws are to carry forward into the future with
any substantive force.
III. REVERSING THE TREND: A BATTERY OF SOLUTIONS FOR RESTORING
STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW

The situation is not hopeless. There are several measures that can
be taken with the aim of restoring state civil rights law as an independent
and vibrant source of protection for victims of discrimination. First,
attorneys on the civil rights bar must make a renewed emphasis on the
primacy of state civil rights law in federal court. Second, federal courts
themselves must make greater use of the certification procedure, a
mechanism by which federal courts can "certify" questions of state law
to be authoritatively construed by the appropriate state supreme court87
Third, state high courts need to help stem the bleeding. State supreme
courts should follow the framework developed by the Minnesota
Supreme Court in Kahn v. Griffin,188 where the court provided a clear

185. Id. at 18-19.
186. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
187. See, e.g., Todd v. Societe BIC, S.A., 9 F.3d 1216, 1222 (7th Cir. 1993).
188. 701 N.W. 2d 815 (Minn. 2005).
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and principled roadmap for interpreting provisions of the Minnesota
89
Constitution more expansively than the United States Constitution.
This framework should be imported into the civil rights arena. Finally,
Congress and state legislatures should act to create a scheme where state
supreme courts could review questions of state law appealed from the
United States Courts of Appeals. Working together, these structural
reforms should restore state civil rights law to its rightful place as a
primary protector of individual rights.
A. A Renewed Emphasis on State Law by the Civil Rights Bar
As discussed above, plaintiffs' attorneys should not be blamed
entirely for the under-enforcement of Minnesota's civil rights laws in
federal courts. If anything, the findings of this Article provide
justification to the attorney who makes little or no attempt to focus on
state anti-discrimination law in a federal forum. But, in the adversarial
system, courts cannot be expected to change course on their own. Here,
the civil rights bar, both public and private, has a role to play. These
attorneys should make a renewed emphasis on the primacy of state civil
rights law in their briefs and arguments.
The obvious drawback to this solution is that it presents major
collective action and free rider problems. If only one segment of the
civil rights bar undertakes this renewed emphasis on state civil rights
law, the entire civil rights bar will reap the diffuse benefits of the
renewed effort. And, if only a handful of attorneys make an effort to
renew the federal courts' attention on state civil rights laws, the effort
will likely not be successful in bringing about systemic change-and the
lawyer making the effort will feel like she wasted her time and money
(not to mention that of her client). While a renewed emphasis on state
law by the civil rights bar is an important part of the solution to the
under-enforcement problem, it is far from sufficient by itself. Other
measures must be taken.
B. FederalCourts Should Make GreaterUse of the Certification
Procedure
A relatively recent invention in American law, the federal
certification procedure allows a federal court to "certify" a question of
state law to be authoritatively answered by the appropriate state supreme
189.

Id. at 828.
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court. 90 The Supreme Court has approved of the certification procedure
as a model of judicial federalism and an economical way to get an
authoritative interpretation when difficult issues of state law are at
More and more states, including Minnesota, have also
issue. 19
approved of the procedure, making it easier than ever before to certify
questions of state law to state supreme courts. 192 The decision to invoke
the certification procedure lies entirely within the discretion of the
federal court. ! 9 3 However, some federal courts have listed a series of
factors which demonstrate that a particular state law question is a good
candidate for certification. The factors can be broken down into three
basic inquiries: (1) how close is the question of state law; (2) how
sufficient are the sources of law (such as precedent) upon which the
federal court must rely; and, (3) how do considerations of comity come
into play in light of the particular issue and case to be decided. 194 The
closer the question, the less sufficient the sources, the greater the need
for comity, the more likely the federal court is to certify the issue of state
law. 195
Federal courts should make greater use of the certification
procedure because state civil rights laws and civil rights issues often
meet these factors. Not every question will be close, but discrimination
claims often contain rich factual scenarios with multiple inferences
capable of being drawn from the available evidence. As discussed
earlier, the body of law federal courts must look to is often
insufficient. 196 Finally, state civil rights laws are not just garden variety
state statutes; they embody broad concepts of public policy. In this
circumstance, the need for comity from the federal courts is at its highest
ebb.
The certification procedure, however, like the renewed emphasis on
state law by the civil rights bar, suffers from a serious practical defect:

190. See, e.g., Todd, 9 F.3d at 1222.
191. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 212 (1960) (citing Allegheny County v.
Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 189 (1959)).
192. See 17A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER & VIKRAM
DAVID AMAR, § 4248, 496-97 n.31-33 (3rd ed. 2007) (lists states and their corresponding
certification procedures).
193. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974).
194. See, e.g., Marston v. Red River Levee & Drainage Dist., 632 F.2d 466, 468 n.3 (5th Cir.
1980).
195. Id.
196. See, e.g., McAdams v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 30 F.3d 1027, 1029 n.3 (8th Cir. 1994)
("Because of the paucity of published caselaw on the [Minnesota Human Rights Act], we look to
precedent arising from similar federal laws .... ") (citations omitted).
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the self-selection problem. Because certification is discretionary, the
only federal courts that would ever certify a question of state law to the
state's supreme court are courts which are mindful of state law in the
first place. 197 Remember Arraleh? It is unlikely that a court which
cannot correctly identify what state's civil rights laws are before it will
entertain the idea of certifying a question of state law to the appropriate
state court. So, while greater use of the certification procedure would
surely help federal courts apply state civil rights laws by building up the
body of state law precedent, this certification procedure would likely do
little to change matters for the intransigent or uninterested federal court.
The certification procedure can also take a good deal of time to
complete. According to one study of the Ohio Supreme Court's
handling of certified questions, the time between federal court
certification and Ohio Supreme Court resolution averaged nearly one
year. 198

Despite these shortcomings, greater reliance on the certification
procedure in close cases would help dislodge state civil rights law from
its current position of near irrelevance in federal forums.
C. State Supreme Courts Should Import the FrameworkDeveloped by
the Minnesota Supreme Court in Kahn v. Griffin into the Civil Rights
Arena
State supreme courts also have a role to play. By developing
principled standards for interpreting state civil rights law in light of
federal precedent, state supreme courts can help encourage a thoughtful
and thorough approach to applying state civil rights law-without
actually reviewing dozens of cases. Such standards would go a long
way towards filling the vacuum left by the relative absence of case law
interpreting state civil rights statutes.
The interpretation of the state constitutions provides an excellent
analogy to the interpretation of state civil rights law. In the case of
Minnesota, the state Constitution contains many provisions that are
similar (if not identical) to the federal Constitution. Although the

197.

Wendy L. Watson, McKinzie Craig, & Daniel Orion Davis, Federal Court Certification

of State-Law Questions: Active Judicial Federalism, 28 JUST. SYS. J. 98, 101 (2007) ("[T]he

certification procedure is a classic case of the fox guarding the hen-house; it gives federal courts
complete control over which questions to certify and thus allows federal courts to determine the

circumstances under which state courts can interpret state law.").
198. Id. at 102 (citing Rebecca A. Cochran, FederalCourt Certificationof Questions ofState
Law to State Courts: A Theoretical and EmpiricalStudy, 29 J. LEGIS. 157, 217 (2003)).
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Minnesota Supreme Court has always maintained the position that the
Minnesota Constitution could be interpreted more broadly than the U.S.
Constitution,' 99 the court was often criticized for not using a principled
basis for deciding whether or not the Minnesota Constitution protected
more rights than its federal counterpart. °0 One commentator, writing
about state constitutional law in general, wrote: "[S]ystematic studies
demonstrate that most state courts, when presented with the opportunity,
have chosen not to depart from federal precedents when interpreting the
[T]he majority of
rights-granting provisions of state constitutions ....
state courts, on most issues, engage in an analysis in lockstep with their
federal counterparts. 2 0°
In Kahn, a federal district court in Minneapolis certified the
question: "Does the Minnesota Constitution provide greater protections
to the right to vote than does the United States Constitution such that
violates
failure to hold prompt elections following decennial redistricting
20 2
the Minnesota Constitution. . . [or state statutory law]?,
In Kahn, the Minnesota Supreme Court took the opportunity to go
beyond the question presented, and adopted a decision tree methodology
to decide-in a principled fashion-whether a particular provision of the
Minnesota Constitution protected more rights than the analogous section
of the U.S. Constitution.20 3 The court summarized its approach like this:
...

[W]e will not, on some slight implication and vague conjecture, depart
from federal precedent ....

But, when we reach a clear and strong

conviction that there is a principled basis for greater protection of the
individual civil and political rights of our citizens under the Minnesota
Constitution, we will not hesitate to interpret the constitution to
independently safeguard those rights ....

[W]e are most inclined to

look to the Minnesota Constitution when we determine that our state

199. Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 828 (2005) (citing Minnesota v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d
90, 97 (Minn. 1999); Minnesota v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722, 726 (1985)).
200. Compare Ascher v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 519 N.W.2d 183, 186-87 (Minn. 1994)
(holding that random sobriety checkpoints, without the police having an objective individualized
articulable suspicion of criminal activity before stopping a driver, violate the state constitutional
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, although the Supreme Court, in Michigan
Dep't of State Police v. Stitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447, 455 (1990), had held such checkpoints do not
violate the Fourth Amendment), with Kahn, 701 N.W. 2d at 836 (holding that given the particular
facts and circumstances presented by the certified question, the Minnesota Constitution did not
provide greater protections to the right to vote than does the U.S. Constitution).
201. Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in the Twenty First
Century, 35 IND. L. REv. 335, 335, 338 (2002).
202. Kahn, 701 N.W.2d at 818.
203. See id. at 828-29.
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constitution's language is different from the language used in the U.S.
Constitution or that state constitutional language guarantees a
fundamental right that is not enumerated in the U.S. Constitution ....
We take a more restrained approach when both constitutions use
identical or substantially similar language. But we will look to the
Minnesota Constitution when we conclude that the United States
Supreme Court has made a sharp or radical departure from its previous
decisions or approach to the law and when we discern no persuasive
reason to follow such a departure .... We also will apply the state

constitution if we determine that the Supreme Court has retrenched on
Bill of Rights issues, or if we determine that federal precedent
does not
20 4
adequately protect our citizens' basic rights and liberties.
Although it may seem odd at first blush to interpret a state
constitution at least partially by reference to the U.S. Constitution, the
Kahn framework deserves credit for acknowledging-and dealing
with-the elephant in the room: the federal precedent that seemed too
often to dictate the interpretation of Minnesota's Constitution. The
Minnesota Supreme Court in Kahn acknowledged explicitly for the first
time federalism's "double source of protection for ... rights, 2 °5 the role

of "the highest court of this state, 20 6 in providing "the first line of
defense for individual liberties, ' 20 7 and the important role of private
litigants in the development of state constitutional law.20 8
State supreme courts should adopt the Kahn methodology to help
courts decide when to interpret state civil rights laws more expansively
than federal civil rights laws. First, such a holding would make clear
that textual differences between the laws, for example, the difference
between Minnesota's sexual harassment statute and Title VII's ban on
sex discrimination, would be treated differently under the analysis. The
same is true for the textual differences between Minnesota and federal
law in the areas of sexual orientation and disability discrimination.
Second, such a framework would protect Minnesota's civil rights laws in
federal courts from getting swept away when the federal courts
"retrench" on a federal civil rights issue. This part of the analysis would
204. Id. at 828 (citations omitted); see also Paul H. Anderson & Julie A. Oseid, A Decision
Tree Takes Root in the Land of 10,000 Lakes: Minnesota's Approach to Judicial Federalism, 70
ALB. L. REV. 865, 866-68, 912-16 (2007).
205. Kahn, 701 N.W.2d at 824 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting William J. Brennan, Jr.,
The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardiansof Individual
Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535, 552 (1986)).
206. Id. at 828.
207, Id.
208. Id. at 829.
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shield Minnesota's civil rights law from automatically meeting the same
fate as federal civil rights laws in the Supreme Court's recent civil rights
jurisprudence; Minnesota law would not automatically fall in lockstep
behind cases like Ledbetter and Buckhannon. Third, the final prong of
the Minnesota Supreme Court's framework-"if we determine that
federal precedent does not adequately protect our citizens' basic rights
and liberties"-would leave courts free to unhinge state civil rights law
from federal law entirely if federal law simply failed to offer the
protection contemplated by the state civil rights regime.
It is too soon to adequately gauge the success of the Kahn
framework as a matter of state constitutional law, but the methodology
adopted in that case shows a great deal of promise and naturally lends
itself to extension into the state civil rights arena. By providing the
appropriate framework for evaluating state civil rights claims in light of
federal precedent, state high courts can send a strong message that state
civil rights law be taken seriously in every forum.
D. The Nuclear Option: Giving States the Power to Review Federal
Appellate Decisions
If the solutions discussed so far do not solve the under-enforcement
problems in federal courts, it may be time for drastic measures. One
such measure would be giving state supreme courts the ability to review
purely state law issues decided by federal appellate courts.
Generally speaking, the United States Supreme Court does not
review matters of purely state law. 20 9 Therefore, when a civil rights
plaintiff receives an appellate decision involving both state and federal
claims, she has usually reached the end of the road on the state law issue.
By contrast, she is free to petition the Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari on any federal issue. 2 '0 Giving the state supreme courts the
power to review questions of purely state law would give such a plaintiff
the opportunity to appeal the state law decisions to the ultimate
interpreting state supreme court, just as she can appeal any federal issues
to the ultimate interpreter of federal law: the United States Supreme
Court.
Such a scheme would require legislation action by both Congress
209.

See Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL-CIO v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 387 (1986) ("[W]e

have no authority to review state determinations of purely state law.").
210.

See, e.g., Todd v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 138 F.3d 733 738 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that

under Title VII and Minnesota law, an employer may escape liability for its supervisor's act of
sexual harassment by taking appropriate action in a timely manner).
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and the states who wished to participate, much like the certification
procedure required under this dual legislative action. To be sure, if a
state tried to adopt such a scheme unilaterally, such action would be preempted by several federal statutes, most notably by the statute granting
the Supreme Court exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from the United
States Courts of Appeals. 21 These federal statutes would need to be
amended. Even if both Congress and the states got behind such a
scheme, it is possible that such a scheme could be found unconstitutional
by the Supreme Court for violating the Diversity Clause or the doctrines
of federalism and separation of powers.21 2
But giving the state court the ultimate authority to interpret state
law would serve to enhance cooperative federalism and restore state civil
rights to plaintiffs in federal courts. The under-enforcement problem
would be fixed if state supreme courts could step in and review the
federal court's most egregious errors.
CONCLUSION
Federal and state civil rights laws are not coextensive. In
Minnesota's case, state civil rights laws offer numerous substantive
protections to victims of discrimination unavailable under federal civil
rights law. Focusing on sexual harassment and disability discrimination,
this Article has tried to demonstrate that these state laws are
systematically and chronically under-enforced in federal court. In
addressing this pervasive problem, this Article offers a variety of
remedial measures aimed at restoring Minnesota's civil rights laws to
their position as an independent and vibrant body of legal protections.
Working together at these changes, lawyers, judges, and legislators can
change a broken system and renew the promise of federalism in the civil
211.
212.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2000).
The Diversity Clause states that: "The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and

equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States . . . to controversies . . .
between citizens of different states ....

" U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 cl. 1. Although some would

likely argue that the Diversity Clause guarantees an absolute right to a federal forum, this position is
undermined by the current state of the law, which limits diversity jurisdiction to cases where more
the S75,000 is in controversy. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000). If the diversity statute is constitutional,
then it should stand for the proposition that there is no absolute, vested right to a federal forum. In

addition, several commentators have suggested abolishing diversity jurisdiction, a plan which is
presumable not unconstitutional. See, e.g., Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court,
Address to the American Law Institute (May 20-23, 1975), in 52 A.L.I. Proc. 29, 36-38 (1975)

(stating that "something must be done" about the court's docket and recommending that Congress
abolish diversity of citizenship, eliminate three-judge district courts, and remove all mandatory
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court not constitutionally required).
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rights arena once again.
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